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Abstract * 
Government imposes impact fees and exactions on the land development process in order to pay for public 
facilities needed to service a particular project. To the extent that the fee or exaction exceeds the land 
developer's proportionate share of the facility's cost, the levy is an unconstitutional taking of property. 
Courts scrutinize the calculations for imposing such fees and exactions by government, particularly if they 
are "ad hoc". It is therefore useful, if not necessary, for government to "regularize" the land development 
condition process through appropriate local ordinances. 
I. Introduction and Background
Land development of any size and substance drives the need for a variety of public facilities to support it. 
Most common is the need for additional roads, public utilities, parks and schools. To this list one could 
logically add police and fire stations and sanitary landfills. The time is long past since government - 
particularly local government - has borne the principal burden of these costs. State and local financial 
resources have been woefully inadequate at least since the end of massive federal subsidies in the early 
1980's. For decades, local government has charged land developers for a part of the cost of such public 
facilities, at least with respect to those facilities intrinsic to the development, in the form of subdivision 
dedications and fees. Initially "charged" as the price of drawing and recording the simpler and cheaper 
subdivision plat in place of the lengthy, tedious and easily-flawed metes and bounds description for land 
development, these fees and dedications soon became part of the regulatory land use process, exercised by 
local government under the police power for the health, safety and welfare of the people, often as a 
method to control or manage growth.1 
However, by justifying such land development dedications and fees as police power regulations, rather 
than "voluntary" costs of using the subdivision, local governments invite judicial scrutiny under the 
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which permits the taking of private 
property for public use only upon payment of just compensation. While early cases by and large upheld 
such intrinsic dedications and fees, the more recent charges of "impact fees" for the shared construction by 
several land developments of large and expensive public facilities (such as municipal wastewater treatment 
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plants and sanitary landfills) outside or extrinsic to the development upon which the fee is levied, led 
knowledgeable courts to scrutinize the connection between such fees and the need generated by the 
charged development for the particular facility in question.2 Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that the 
law applicable to impact fees, exactions and in lieu fees, as well as to compulsory dedications, is the same, 
given that they all represent land development conditions, levied at some point in the land development 
process such as subdivision approval, building permit, occupancy permit or utility connection.3 Therefore, 
except where the text specifically makes such distinctions, the terms are here used interchangeably. 
The search for such a connection or "nexus," without which such fees, dedications and exactions are 
generally unconstitutional takings of property without compensation, is the major legal issue with respect 
to such land development regulations, particularly after the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission,4 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.5 Therefore much of this paper is devoted to 
these cases and their progeny. 
Critical as the takings/nexus issue is, there are other legal requirements for attaching conditions to the 
development of land. Among these are the need for authority to levy such dedications, fees and other 
exactions, in the form of enabling legislation and local ordinances, to avoid the charge that they are "ad 
hoc," and the need to expend the fee, whether "in lieu" of a dedication requirement or an impact fee, 
within a reasonable period of time after collection. As the history and cases make abundantly clear, such 
land development conditions are development driven: to be valid, they must be collected (and exactions 
and dedications required) for, and only for, public facilities and infrastructure for which land development 
causes a need.6 Courts uniformly strike down (usually as an unauthorized tax) land development 
conditions which are not so connected.7 Generally, this includes attempts to remedy existing infrastructure 
deficiencies,8 or to provide for operation and maintenance of facilities.9 Of course, if payment for a public 
facility, or its construction or dedication, is in part fulfillment of a landowner's contractual obligations 
under a development agreement between landowner and local government, then the legal issues and 
analysis are entirely different and the need for nexus and proportionality, at least as a matter of 
constitutional law, disappears.10 
II. Nexus, Proportionality, and Takings: Nollan, Dolan and 
Progeny 
Once courts recognized land development conditions such as impact fees, dedications and other exactions 
as an exercise of the police power, limitations thereon soon became obvious and evident. A series of state 
cases dealt with such issues throughout the 1970's and 1980's. However, the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission11 and Dolan v. City of Tigard,12 imposed a 
national uniformity on the police power common law with respect to such land development conditions, 
particularly concerning the necessary connection between the exaction or condition and the land 
development project which is subject to such an exaction or condition. The cases preceding Nollan and 
Dolan are therefore less important as a class than those which follow. Both, however, are treated in this 
extended section. 
A. Nollan and Nexus. Decided on the last day of the U.S. Supreme Court's 1987 term, Nollan v. 
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California Coastal Commission13 deals ostensibly with beach access. The plaintiffs sought a coastal 
development permit from the California Coastal Commission in order to tear down a beach house and 
build a bigger one. The Commission imposed a condition on the permit, requiring the granting of an 
easement to permit the public to use one-third of the property on the beach side. For the privilege of 
substantially upgrading a beach house, the owner was forced to dedicate to the public lateral access over 
much of his backyard for more beach for the public to walk upon. The California Court of Appeal had held 
this was a valid exercise of the Commission's police power under its statutory duty to protect the 
California Coast. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Noting that the taking of such an access over private property by itself 
would require compensation, the Court then examined whether the same requirement, imposed under the 
police or regulatory power of the Commission rather than under its powers of eminent domain, would 
modify the "just compensation" requirement.14 The direct holding of the Court was that in this case it did 
not and that compensation was required. The rationale of the Court is critical. The Court observed that 
land use regulations do not effect takings if they substantially advance legitimate state interests and do not 
deny an owner the economically viable use of his land. But even assuming (without deciding) that 
legitimate state interests include, in the Commission's words, protecting public views of the beach and 
assisting the public in overcoming the psychological barrier to the beach created by overdevelopment, the 
Court could not accept the Commission's position that there was any nexus between these interests and the 
condition attached to Nollan's beach house redevelopment: 
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the public beaches 
be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by 
the new house. It is also impossible to understand how it lowers any "psychological barrier" to 
using the public beaches, or how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on them caused by 
construction of the Nollans' new house. We therefore find that the Commission's imposition of the 
permit condition cannot be treated as an exercise of its land use power for any of these purposes.15
However, said the Court, it is an altogether different matter if there is an "essential nexus" between the 
condition (read impact fee or exaction) and what the landowner proposes to do with the property: 
Thus, if the Commission attached to the permit some condition that would have protected the 
public's ability to see the beach notwithstanding the construction of the new house--for example, a 
height limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on fences--so long as the Commission could have 
exercised its police power (as we assumed it could) to forbid construction of the house altogether, 
imposition of the condition would also be constitutional. Moreover (and here we come closer to the 
facts of the present case), the condition would be constitutional even if it consisted of the 
requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with whose 
sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere. . . . The evident constitutional propriety 
disappears, however, if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end 
advanced as the justification for the prohibition. . . . the lack of nexus between the condition and 
the original purpose the building restriction converts that purpose into something other than what 
it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid 
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governmental purpose, but without payment of compensation. Whatever may be the outer limits of 
"legitimate state interests" in the takings and land use context, this is not one of them.16 
In short, the Supreme Court appears to have adopted the "rational nexus" test concerning exactions, in-lieu 
fees and impact fees. 
B. Dolan and Proportionality. In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Supreme Court struck down a municipal 
building permit condition that the landowner dedicate bike path and greenway/floodplain easements to the 
city. As the Court pointed out, had Tigard simply required such dedications, it would be required to pay 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Attaching them as building permit conditions required a more 
sophisticated analysis closely following Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, since the police power 
is implicated rather than the power of eminent domain. In the process, the Court signaled how far local 
government may go in passing on the cost of public facilities to landowners. The answer: only to the 
extent that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed 
development. 
The Dolans own and operate a 9700 square foot plumbing and electrical supply store on main street in 
Tigard's central business district. Seeking to double the size of the store and pave a 39-space parking lot, 
the Dolans applied for a building permit from the City Planning Commission. Tigard had previously 
adopted a comprehensive land use plan required by state comprehensive land use management statutes, in 
accordance with statewide goals.17 Many of the plan's features are codified in Tigard's Community 
Development Code (CDC). Among the plan's requirements: 
1.  In accordance with a pedestrian/bicycle pathway plan, new development must dedicate land for 
pathways where shown on the plan; 
2.  In accordance with a master drainage plan, to combat the risks of flooding in 100-year floodplains, 
especially as exacerbated by increased impervious surface through development, developers along 
waterways such as Fanno Creek (which borders the Dolan parcel to the west), must guarantee the 
floodway and floodplain are free of structures and able to contain floodwaters by preserving the 
land alongside as greenway. 
As a result of the plan and its codification in the CDC, the Commission granted the Dolans their building 
permit upon condition that they dedicate the portion of their property in the floodplain as a greenway, and 
that an additional 15-foot strip be dedicated adjacent to the greenway as a pedestrian bicycle path. The 
basis of these requirements is a series of Commission findings. 
With respect to the bikeway, the Commission found that the pathway system as an alternative means of 
transportation "could" offset some of the traffic demand on nearby streets and lessen the increase in traffic 
congestion. The Commission also found it was reasonable to assume that some of the Dolans' customers 
and staff could use the pathway for transportation and recreation. With respect to the floodplain greenway 
dedication, the Commission found it was reasonably related to the Dolans' application since the site would 
have more impervious surface. This would result in increased stormwater drainage. Therefore the 
dedication requirement was related to the applicants' plans for more intensive development of their land. 
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After appealing to various local and state administrative agencies and to the Oregon courts without 
success, the Dolans challenged the holding of the Oregon Supreme Court that the City of Tigard could 
condition the approval of their building permit on the dedication of property for flood control and traffic 
improvement. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to set out the "required degree of connection 
between the exactions imposed by the city and the projected impacts of the proposed development."18 
The Court essentially adopted a three-part test: 
1.  Does the permit condition seek to promote a legitimate state interest? 
2.  Is there an essential nexus between the legitimate state interest and the permit condition? 
3.  Is there a required degree of connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the 
development? 
The Court disposed of the first two quickly and affirmatively. Certainly the prevention of flooding along 
the creek and the reduction of traffic in the business district "qualify as the type of legitimate public 
purposes we have upheld."19 Moreover, the court held it was "equally obvious" that a nexus exists 
between preventing flooding and limiting development within the creek's floodplain, and that "the same 
may be said for the city's attempt to reduce traffic congestion by providing for alternative means of 
transportation" like a "pedestrian/bicycle pathway."20 So far, so good: we have public purpose (which the 
Court assumed without deciding in Nollan) and essential nexus (which the Court decided was lacking in 
Nollan). The question remained, with respect to the third test: "[W]hether the degree of the exactions 
demanded by the city's permit conditions bear the required relationship to the projected impact of 
petitioner's proposed development."21 
The Court said no: the city's "tentative findings" concerning increased stormwater flow from the more 
intensively developed property, together with its statement that such development was "anticipated to 
generate additional vehicular traffic thereby increasing congestion" on nearby streets, were simply not 
"constitutionally sufficient to justify the conditions imposed by the city on petitioner's building permit."22 
The Court's test is "rough proportionality": 
[T]he city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is 
related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.23
Applying the test to the Dolan hardware store property, the Court concluded that the City of Tigard 
demanded too much to pass this third nexus/rough proportionality test. Simply concluding that a bikeway 
easement could offset some of the traffic demand which the new hardware store would generate did not 
constitute sufficiently quantified findings for the taking of an easement. While the Court 
[has] no doubt that the city was correct in finding that the larger retail sales facility proposed by 
petitioner will increase traffic on the streets . . . the city has not met its burden of demonstrating 
that the additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by the petitioner's development 
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reasonably relate to the city's requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway 
easement. The city simply found that the creation of the pathway "could offset some of the traffic 
demand . . . and lessen the increase in traffic congestion . . . ." [T]he city must make some effort to 
quantify its findings . . . beyond the conclusory statement [quoted above].24 
As to the greenway easement, while the Court said 
It is axiomatic that increasing the amount of impervious surface will increase the quantity and rate 
of storm-water flow from petitioner's property . . . the city demanded more--it not only wanted 
petitioner not to build in the floodplain, but it also wanted petitioner's property along Fanno Creek 
for its Greenway system. The city has never said why a public greenway, as opposed to a private 
one, was required in the interest of flood control.25 
The constitutional problem in both instances is "the loss of [their] ability to exclude" which the Court 
reminds us is one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are characterized as property: 
We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of 
Rights as the First Amendment [free speech, press, religion, association, assembly] or Fourth 
Amendment, [search and seizure] should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in these 
comparable circumstances.26 
C. Applicability to All Land Development Conditions. An initial issue is the range of land development 
conditions to which Nollan and Dolan are applicable. At one extreme is the view that only land dedication 
conditions are affected by these two decisions, since land dedications were the only such conditions at 
issue in either case. This view is bolstered by the language in Dolan and other recent U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions which focus on property rights and the ability to exclude, which Chief Justice Rehnquist either 
wrote, or in which he concurred.27 At the other extreme is the view that the cases apply to all land 
development conditions. An arguable middle view is that the cases apply to impact and in lieu fees as well 
as land dedications. 
Needless to say, the cases which strike down land dedications for lack of nexus and/or proportionality are 
legion, both pre- and post- Nollan and Dolan. One such case, from the Second Circuit, is Walz v. Town of 
Smithtown,28 There, landowners were denied access to the public water supply when they refused to deed 
the front fifteen feet of their property to Smithtown for road widening purposes. Finding a total lack of 
nexus between water service and road widening, the court found that "As landowners, the Walzes surely 
had a right not to be compelled to convey some of their land in order to obtain utility service."29 
Similarly, the court in Schultz v. City of Grants Pass30 struck down the city's condition that Schultz 
dedicate a parcel for street widening in exchange for approval of an application to partition the parcel. The 
court first addressed the extent of the dedication, concluding that the dedication would require the owners 
to part with 20,000 square feet of their land. The city had determined that with full development of the 
parcel, 15 to 20 homes could be placed on the parcel, causing considerable impact on transportation on the 
streets. The court held that the city was required to examine the actual proposed development--here 
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partitioning into 2 lots--to determine the impact on transportation. Applying Dolan to the proposed 
condition, the court concluded that a slight increase of traffic from the two lots did not justify a 20,000 
square foot dedication, and therefore there was no rough proportionality between the exaction and the 
impact from the development. 
Applying a specifically and uniquely attributable test a Connecticut court in Timber Trails Corp. v. 
Planning and Zoning Comm'n of the Town of Sherman,31 struck down an off-site road improvement 
condition on subdivision approval on the ground that problems with existing highways were not so 
specifically and uniquely attributable to abutting subdivisions. The Connecticut Supreme Court applied a 
less stringent test in Property Group, Inc. v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n of the Town of Tolland,32 
striking down a road widening condition on a subdivision approval for only ten lots. The court found that 
the road problems were preexisting and there was no substantial evidence the widening was necessitated 
by the proposed development. The Kentucky court of appeals also struck down a bridge construction and 
dedication requirement as a subdivision approval and rezoning requirement in Lexington-Fayette Urban 
County Government v. Schneider and Hi Acres Development Company,33 because there was no 
reasonable relationship between the development and the need for the bridge. 
A more egregious example is Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg,34 in which the Village attempted 
to exact 20% of Amoco's land for roadway widening purposes before permitting other redevelopment at a 
gasoline service station. Finding that such an exaction on the basis of a 0.4% increase in traffic "does not 
correspond with the slightest notions of rough proportionality,"35 the court held that exaction "constitutes 
a taking under both the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the 
Illinois Constitution."36 
To the same effect is Cobb v. Snohomish County,37 striking down a road improvement fee because the 
county could not show the improvements were reasonably necessary for the particular level of service to 
be provided;38 Dellinger v. City of Charlotte,39 striking down a road dedication requirement for failure to 
make written findings relating dedication to traffic from a proposed subdivision; and The Luxembourg 
Group, Inc. v. Snohomish County,40 striking down the dedication of a 60 foot right of way as a 
disproportional condition for approving a 15 lot subdivision. 
Although the above cases deal mainly with land dedication requirements, it is difficult to support the view 
that the proportionality and nexus tests identified in Nollan and Dolan apply only to such land dedications. 
First, the Court remanded the California impact fees case of Ehrlich v. Culver City to the California Court 
of Appeals just days after deciding Dolan, with the direction that it be reviewed in light of the Dolan 
decision. Second, and equally as important, the California Supreme Court accepted review of the 
remanded Court of Appeals decision in Ehrlich and in a lengthy and complex opinion, held that Dolan 
applied beyond land dedication conditions to impact fees, though only to a limited range of such fees as 
are ad hoc and not part of a regularized system of exactions.41 Citing Nollan, the Ehrlich court expressed 
concern that adjudicative, ad hoc conditions on development present "an inherent and heightened risk that 
local government will manipulate the police power to impose conditions unrelated to legitimate land use 
regulatory ends, thereby avoiding what would otherwise be an obligation to pay just compensation."42 In 
response to this concern, the court drew a distinction between legislatively formulated development fees 
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imposed on a broad class of property owners and individually imposed conditions. 
The court held that in the "relatively narrow class of land use cases" that involve individual "land use 
'bargains' between property owners and regulatory bodies. . . where the individual property owner-
developer seeks to negotiate approval of a planned development. . . the combined Nollan and Dolan test 
quintessentially applies."43 In the more common situation when exactions are imposed pursuant to a 
general legislative act, cities act within their traditional police powers. 
The Ehrlich court is not alone in holding that such legislative exactions are immune to Dolan's 
proportionality/nexus standards.44 Why this should be so is not particularly clear. Justice Thomas of the U.
S. Supreme Court has commented that "The distinction between sweeping legislative takings and 
particularized administrative takings appears to be a distinction without a difference."45 Although noting 
that it was not bound by Justice Thomas's dissent, an Illinois court concurred, stating that it found his 
comments ". . . particularly persuasive and consonant with the rationale underlying Dolan and similar 
cases. Certainly a municipality should not be able to insulate itself from a takings challenge merely by 
utilizing a different bureaucratic vehicle when expropriating a citizen's property."46 To the same effect is 
Shultz v. City of Grants Pass,47 striking down a 20,000 square foot exaction required by the terms and 
standards of a local ordinance. 
Indeed, many courts since Dolan, both state and federal, appear to have adopted the nexus and 
proportionality tests which mark that decision for more than land dedications. An excellent example is the 
Eighth Circuit decision in Christopher Lake Dev't Co. v. St. Louis County,48 where the court applied 
Dolan to strike down a county drainage system requirement. The County granted the owner of forty-two 
acres preliminary development approval for two residential communities on condition that it provide a 
drainage system for an entire watershed. First, the court dealt with the public purpose issue, or part one of 
the Dolan test. The court stated that "even assuming the legitimacy of the County's purpose in requiring a 
drainage system, the application of the Criteria may violate the equal protection clause."49 Citing Nollan 
for the nexus or second test, the court then opined that "Although the County's objective to prevent 
flooding may be rational, it may not be rational to single out the Partnership to provide the entire drainage 
system."50 The court then found such a requirement disproportionate to the drainage problems resulting 
from the proposed development: 
[F]rom our review of the record, the County has forced the Partnership to bear a burden that 
should fairly have been allocated throughout the watershed area. "A strong public desire to 
improve the public condition will not warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the 
constitutional way of paying for the change."51 
As for a remedy, the court said: 
We believe that the Partnership is entitled to recoup the portion of its expenditures in excess of its 
pro rata share and remand to the district court to determine the details and amounts.52 
To be fair, there are cases which would limit such exactions to land dedications only, but most are pre-
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Ehrlich and the reasoning does not appear as sound.53 Most courts, however, apply Dolan beyond 
dedications, at least to impact fees and in-lieu fees. The reasoning is compelling. As an Oregon appeals 
court said in Clark v. City of Albany:54 
[T]he fact that Dolan itself involved conditions that required a dedication of property interests does 
not mean that it applies only to conditions of that kind. . . . For purposes of a takings analysis, we 
see little difference between a requirement that a developer convey title to the part of the property 
that is to serve a public purpose and a requirement that the developer himself make improvements 
on the affected and nearby property and make it available for the same purpose.55 
Thus, for example, in Castle Homes & Dev't, Inc. v. City of Brier,56 the court struck down a $3000 per lot 
road impact fee on a proposed 28 lot subdivision on nexus and proportionality grounds. The court in 
Trimen Dev't County v. King Co.57 upheld a park development fee, but only after finding proportionality. 
Other pre-Dolan cases similarly applied nexus/proportionality standards in either upholding or striking 
down fees rather than dedications of land: Lancaster Redevelopment Agency v. Dibley,58 striking down a 
traffic impact fee to fund housing; Shapell Indus. Inc. v. Governing Bd. of the Milpitas Unified Sch. 
Dist.,59 striking down school impact fee designed to benefit all new students rather than those generated 
only by the development. 
Some courts are willing to extend the nexus/proportionality requirements to all land development 
regulations. Going well beyond both land dedications and impact fees is the application of Dolan in 
Manocherian v. Lenox Hospital.60 There, the New York Court of Appeals struck down a rent stabilization 
statute in part because it did not advance "a closely and legitimately connected State interest." Citing both 
the Dolan and Nollan cases, the court said: 
[T]he Supreme Court refrained from placing any limitations or distinctions or classifications on 
the application of the "essential nexus" test. This suggests and supports a uniform, clear and 
reasonably definitive standard of review in takings cases . . . . Indeed, Justice Brennan, in dissent 
in Nollan, expressly attributed to the majority's holding in Nollan an impact on all regulatory 
takings cases, stating that the Court's "exactitude, is inconsistent with our standard for reviewing 
the rationality of a State's exercise of its police power for the welfare of its citizens."61 
D. Level of Detail for Showing Nexus and Proportionality. Few if any courts are enforcing the 
"uniquely and specifically attributable" test, particularly after Dolan, although they are arguably free to do 
so as the test is more protective of constitutionally protected private property rights. Several courts have 
addressed this issue, both before and after Nollan and Dolan. They also deal concretely with the level of 
detail required to meet proportionality and nexus standards. An excellent example of what is required 
comes from the New Jersey case of F & W Associates v. County of Somerset.62 Holding that traffic 
impact fees assessed against a developer met the rational nexus test, the court held: 
The developer's pro-rata share must be "necessitated or required by the construction or 
improvements within such subdivision. . . ." [citation omitted] The statute is a codification . . . 
which focused on the "rational nexus" between the needs created by, and the benefits conferred 
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upon, the subdivision and the cost of the off-tract improvements.63 
Noting that the ordinance assessing the impact fees was adopted "only after a comprehensive study of such 
factors as existing road facilities, current zoning, projected population growth, and existing commercial 
uses in the area[,]"64 the court dismissed the notion that: 
a causal nexus between the necessity for off-tract improvements and the development must be 
measured with precision. . . . What must be demonstrated is a "rational" nexus, not mathematical 
certainty. For example, the assessment should not be invalidated simply because there may be 
residual benefit conferred to the general public in its use of the off-tract road improvement. An 
assessment is subject to challenge only if the developer is required to pay a "disproportionate 
share of the cost of improvements that also benefit other persons."65 
The court set out in detail what an acceptable comprehensive study should contain: 
The study devised a volume-capacity ratio, measuring the demand volume and Mountain 
Boulevard's capacity. Based on projected full development of potential residential, retail and office 
use, the study adopted vehicle "trip generation" methodology and from this model, predicted 
incremental traffic impact resulting from future development of the land. The study estimated how 
much extra traffic would be generated by each development in the target area (Mountain 
Boulevard and surrounding roadways). The estimates were grounded on industrial standards, 
observations and empirical data obtained from traffic counts. The study then suggested what 
roadway improvements would be needed to accommodate the increased demands, and estimated 
the cost of those improvements.66 
Noting that the township ordinance adopted the results of this "exacting study," the court observed that the 
ordinance authorized traffic impact fees according to the formula for calculating each developer's share of 
the cost of the needed off-tract improvements. Not only does the ordinance provide for adjustment of the 
developer's pro rata share if conditions change, but it also exempts a developer from the fee altogether if 
the development's off-tract impact is negligible, or if the developer does not benefit from the highway 
improvement.67 
Even before Dolan, the court in Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Du Page68 also 
set out a procedure for land development conditions described by one expert in the field as 
"overwhelming" and demonstrating "a level of effort that he had never seen before."69 The county was 
seeking to meet Illinois' strict "specifically and uniquely attributable" test for road improvement impact 
fees provided for by statute. First, the court held that the county met the test of imposing a fee only for 
road improvements made necessary by the additional traffic generated by the new development: 
The formula used by the county imposes fees only on road improvement costs generated by new 
development. In order to quantify the amount of travel generated by different types of development, 
the county used the Chicago Area Transit (CATS) model, which mathematically traces cars as they 
leave particular developments and enter on the roads. The county also used trip-generation data 
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collected by the Institute for Transportation Engineering. 
Furthermore, Du Page County developed its own computer model which gave it the ability to 
model future travel based on new development. The County did travel surveys which allowed it to 
determine which road segments were deficient due to existing development. Impact fee funds are 
not spent on those roads. . . . We hold that the data gathered by Du Page County ensures that it 
imposes impact fees only for the improvements made necessary by new development.70 
Then, the court further found that under the county system the new developments receive direct and 
material benefit from the road improvements financed by their impact fees: 
Du Page County divided itself into 11 districts based on the following criteria: location of existing 
and proposed municipal boundaries; locations of major developable parcels of land; existing 
major retail/employment centers; location of potential transportation corridors; CATS one-quarter-
section-based zone system; and the existing county highway system. The funds collected from new 
development in a particular district are used to finance improvements in that same district. 
Testimony at trial established that fee payers in a district do benefit from the decrease in 
congestion resulting from the improvements made in that district.71 
III. Authority
While most courts will uphold a local government exaction or impact fee as an extension of statutory 
subdivision or development code police power authority,72 several states have nevertheless passed 
specific legislation to enable the collection of impact fees on the land development process. Typically, 
these statutes tend to place limits on exactions and impact fees - either by type or by extent - rather than 
extend authority beyond what can usually be fairly implied from planning and subdivision state enabling 
statutes. Typical in this regard is the new impact fees enabling act in Hawaii which requires a series of 
preliminary steps, including a needs study, before a county can levy such a fee.73 But on balance, courts 
increasingly decide the validity of fees and exactions on police power issues discussed in Section II, rather 
than on the basis of specific statutory authority.74 
There are nevertheless some cases which imply that enabling legislation is necessary in order to impose 
impact fees as opposed to intrinsic subdivision dedications and in-lieu fees which are based upon planning 
and subdivision statutes. Thus, for example, in Englewood Water Dist. v. Halstead,75 a Florida court 
upheld impact fees for a new water and sewer system because a state enabling statute authorized the 
District "to fix and collect rates, fees and other charges for the use of the facilities and services provided 
by any water system or sewer system."76 Also, in City of Arvade v. Denver,77 the Colorado Supreme 
Court upheld a development fee for water on all new development on virtually identical statutory grounds. 
It also similarly upheld a "facilities development fee" for sewers,78 while striking down a school impact 
fee on the ground the county lacked specific authority.79 
Other courts have held that if a county has the power to fail to approve a plat because of the inadequacy of 
park and recreational space, it has the power to levy a fee in lieu of dedication. In Jenad, Inc. v. Village of 
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Scarsdale,80 the New York Court of Appeals held that the planning board's requirement that a subdivider 
dedicate land within the subdivision for a park, or pay a fee in lieu of such dedication, was a valid exercise 
of the police power. The court rejected the argument that the fees were a tax, and analogized them to a 
type of zoning, like setback and side yard regulations. If counties have the power to zone lands for 
recreational purposes, they certainly should have the power to exact fees to accomplish the same purpose: 
This is not a tax at all but a reasonable form of village planning for the general community good. . . 
This was merely a kind of zoning, like setback and side yard-regulations, minimum size of lots, etc., 
and akin also to other reasonable requirements necessary sewers, water mains, lights, sidewalks, 
etc. If the developers did not provide for parks. . . the municipality would have to do it.81 
Jenad's rationale supports the general proposition that the authority to enact an impact fee springs from the 
discretion to deny subdivision approval, unless parks were suitably located. The power to restrict includes 
the power to compel: 
We find in section 179-1 of the Village Law a sufficient grant to villages of power to make such 
exactions. In specific terms the statute validates "in proper case" requirements by village planning 
boards that a subdivision map, to obtain approval, must show "a park or parks suitably located for 
playground and recreational purposes." There is, to be sure, no such specificity as to a village rule 
setting up a "money in lieu of land system." However, section 179-1 says that a village planning 
board, when specific circumstances of a particular plat are such that park lands therein are not 
requisite, may "waive" provisions therefor, "subject to appropriate conditions and guarantees."82 
Specific authority to levy one exaction--for school site dedication or in-lieu fee at the subdivision approval 
stage--has been held to preempt a county from levying a later (occupancy certificate stage) impact fee for 
facilities construction and expansion, however.83 
IV. Segregation Of Funds, Credits And Refunds 
Funds collected by local government as impact fees must be placed in separate bank accounts relating to 
the public facility for which the fee is collected, and then used only for that kind or type of public facility, 
and both the Livermore, California ordinance and the Hawaii statute, appended to this chapter, so require. 
Thus, for example, it would be illegal to use road impact fees for the construction of schools. Of course, 
under the proportionality and rational nexus principles discussed above, the facility constructed must be 
useful to the developer paying the fee, which usually means it must be nearby. This requirement has led 
many local governments to create "zones" in which needed public facilities will be constructed with funds 
only from new developments in the same zone.84 
Capital improvements or public facilities, constructed with impact fees, must "adequately" benefit the new 
development which paid the fee. By earmarking fees collected into separate accounts apart from general 
funds, and spending those funds reasonably quickly, local governments avoid charges that the fees are 
merely veiled attempts at taxation--for which they must have specific authority from the state. In Home 
Builders Ass'n v. Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County,85 the court held that benefits 
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accruing to the community generally do not adversely affect the validity of a development regulation as 
long as the fee does not exceed the cost of the improvements serving the new development and the 
improvements adequately benefit the development which is the source of the fee. The court reasoned: "It is 
difficult to envision any capital improvement for parks, sewers, drainage, roads, or whatever, which would 
not in some measure benefit members of the community who do not reside in or utilize the new 
development."86 Earlier, Amherst Builders Ass'n v. City of Amherst87 upheld a sewer tap-in charge, 
requiring the fees to be placed into a sewer fund, apart from general revenues. Coulter v. City of 
Rawlins88 held: "The limitation on this power is the requirement that any fees collected in lieu of raw-
land dedication must be earmarked to accounts for the purpose of acquiring needed park and maintenance 
of existing park facilities." Indeed, a Utah court has struck down a fee charged for improving a water and 
sewer system because the fees collected went into the general fund.89 To the same effect is Lafferty v. 
Payson City,90 Waterbury Dev't Co. v. Witten,91 and Hayes v. City of Albany.92 
Dividing the County into impact fee districts, depending upon the public facility or capital improvement is 
recommended to "localize" the benefit, ensuring that capital improvements or public facilities funded 
"adequately" benefit the new development which paid the fee, even if the community at large also 
benefits.93 Thus, for example, the Palm Beach County ordinance based fees in Home Builders Ass'n v. 
Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County94 on a formula that considered the costs of road 
construction and the number of motor vehicle trips generated by different types of land use. Alternatively, 
the developer may determine his fair share by furnishing his own independent study. Fees are deposited 
into one of the special trust funds established for each of forty zones within the county, and funds may be 
spent only in the zone from which they were collected. If funds are not spent within a reasonable time (six 
years), they are returned to the present owner of the property.95 Even though improvements constructed 
with the fees collected will benefit the community generally, the above factors insured that the ordinance 
satisfied the two prong rational nexus test which requires 1) that the fee not exceed the cost of the 
improvements required by the new development, and 2) that the improvements adequately benefit the 
development which is the source of the fee.96 As indicated in the discussion of the Home Builders case 
above, if the fee collected and deposited in an appropriate fund is not used within a reasonable period of 
time it must be refunded to the developer, on the ground that this development-driven fee is really not 
needed after all. Moreover, if the land developer has already made contributions in the form of money, 
land or facilities, or if development property tax dollars are going to pay for part of the new facility, the 
developer is usually credited against the fee normally levied for these amounts.97 By the same reasoning, 
it has been held that specific statutory authority to require dedication of land or levy fees in lieu thereof for 
school purposes will preempt a county from levying an additional impact fee for school facilities at the 
occupancy certificate stage, based on state general enabling legislation.98 
V. Planning Consistency
Courts are more likely to uphold impact fees, and the fees are more successfully and logically calculated, 
when the local government has a plan - which anticipates growth - which shows how and when public 
facilities needs are likely to be generated in terms of type and location of facility.99 Few cases turn on this 
requirement, but at least one state supreme court has held that impact fees and other exactions can be 
collected only if pursuant to a local government's comprehensive plan.100 Most well drafted impact fee 
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ordinances require such a plan. 
VI. Subject-Specific Impact Fees 
Exactions are levied for a variety of public facilities. The law applicable to such fees is not generally 
dependant on the type of fee, but rather the strength of the public purpose behind the fee. Such a 
demonstrated public purpose, while often presumed, is necessary before reaching either nexus or 
proportionality. 
Within the two subsets of dedication and impact fees exists an expansive list of what can be considered an 
exaction. School facilities, water and sewer improvements, park and recreational fees, low-income housing 
fees, street improvements, all have been imposed as either dedication or fee conditions to development or 
redevelopment of property. Courts have upheld both on-site and off-site conditions. As might logically be 
expected, the more clearly the exaction relates to the impact of the development, the more likely a court is 
to uphold the exaction. On this basis, as a class, street improvements and sewer and water improvements 
are more likely to be upheld than low-income housing fees and set-asides, as the former are more clearly 
impacted by most land development than the latter. If the local government can show that there is an 
essential or rational nexus between the exaction and the government's legitimate state interests in relieving 
the impact of the development by imposing the exaction, and that the exaction is roughly proportionate to 
the impact of the development, the exaction will withstand judicial scrutiny. If, however, either test cannot 
be met, courts will strike down the exaction as an uncompensated taking. In sum, the type of exaction 
itself may well determine whether there exists an essential nexus, and the character of the exaction may 
impact on the proportionality requirement. 
VII. Cost And Calculation Of Fees
Impact fees are charged for a variety of public facilities in local governments throughout the United States, 
including, but not limited to, transportation, wastewater treatment, water distribution, solid waste disposal, 
parks, schools, libraries, public electricity, police and fire stations, and public housing. According to a 
recent study, such fees can add considerably to the cost of the development upon which they are 
levied.101 
Typical impact fee calculations might look like those shown in Table One. 
Table One: Typical Impact Fee Calculations * 
Type of Impact Fee 
Single Home Per 
Unit 
General Industry 
Per 1000 sq. foot 
General Office Per 
1000 sq. foot 
General Retail Per 
1000 sq. foot 
Road 
Low $16 $41 $79 $200 
High $7,782 $5,210 $16,500 $36,063 
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Ave. $1,567 $1,364 $2,141 $3,268 
Park 
Low $50 $130 $130 $130 
High $12,000 $1,688 $1,688 $1,688 
Ave. $1,035 $702 $715 $703 
Public Facility 
Low $49 $7 $57 $57 
High $7,169 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 
Ave. $910 $1,385 $1,447 $1,481 
Police 
Low $14 $8 $8 $8 
High $933 $520 $520 $520 
Ave. $120 $86 $110 $111 
Fire 
Low $21 $1 $3 $3 
High $2,500 $1,000 $1,370 $2,400 
Ave. $217 $157 $204 $244 
Library 
Low $90 $90 $90 $90 
High $238 $150 $261 $158 
Ave. $130 $118 $167 $133 
School 
Low $135 $250 $250 $250 
High $3,160 $280 $280 $280 
Ave. $2,663 $259 $259 $259 
Water 
Low $60 $30 $30 $30 
High $11,660 $50 $104 $62 
Ave. $1,225 $37 $55 $41 
Sewer 
Low $40 $60 $60 $60 
High $9,405 $1,440 $1,440 $1,440 
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Ave. $1,558 $750 $750 $750 
TOTAL 
LOW $415 $617 $811 $828 
HIGH $54,847 $22,538 $34,163 $54,611 
AVE. $9,425 $4,858 $5,848 $6,990 
LESS WATER & 
SEWER 
LOW $315 $527 $707 $738 
HIGH $33,782 $21,048 $33,519 $53,009 
AVE. $7,642 $4,071 $5,043 $6,199 
* These averages originate from the 206 local governments participating in this survey. 
An impact fee ordinance should relate the fee charged to needs generated by the new development and 
benefits conferred. Calculation of the fees should be tied to a study, report, or plan based on an analysis of 
new development's impact, as cases discussed in parts II and VI, and the text of the attached ordinance 
from Livermore, California demonstrate. For example, most water and sewer impact fees are based on the 
amount of flowage required by a certain type of development. As with all types of impact fees, the 
analysis should demonstrate that the capital improvements planned with the funds collected are 
necessitated at least in part by the fee payor, and that fees collected will adequately benefit the new 
development paying the fee.102 
Thus, in Amherst Builders Ass'n v. City of Amherst,103 the schedule of fees was based on average sewage 
flow for various types of structures, as estimated by the Environmental Protection Agency, resulting in a 
fee of $400 for a single family home. In response to charges that the fee was invalid, the city introduced 
evidence demonstrating that the "capital cost" of each connection (the cost of facilities required to service 
each new user of the system) was an average of $1,186 per connection. The Ohio Supreme Court stated: 
While it is true that the $1 per gallon charge is not a mathematically precise estimate of the cost of 
service to each new user, appellant is hard-pressed to assert this as a basis for invalidating the 
ordinance when one considers that the resultant $400 fee is much less than the figure derived from 
a more precise analysis.104 
The court also noted that, by keying the schedule to the EPA guidelines, the city was attempting to make 
the fee of each new user proportionate to the gallons of sewage flow contributed by a particular type of 
structure. "Thus, the fee not only attempts to equalize the burden between present and new users, but also 
among the latter, depending on the burden each puts on the system."105 
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court has observed that when water and sewer connection fees are less 
than the costs a city would incur in accommodating new users of its water and sewer systems, it would 
reject characterizing the fees as taxes.106 The court stated that "raising expansion capital by setting 
connection charges, which do not exceed a pro rata share of reasonably anticipated costs of expansion, is 
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permissible where expansion is reasonably required, if use of money collected is limited to meeting the 
costs of expansion."107 
The sewer and water "development fee" ordinance in Coulter v. City of Rawlins,108 was upheld even 
though the city did not demonstrate how it arrived at a fee schedule. The facts state only that the city 
estimated a need for $36,000,000 in capital improvements to expand the sewer and water system to meet 
population projections, according to a plan developed by the city.109 However, it is now necessary to have 
a demonstrable basis for such fees, after the Dolan and Nollan cases. In Lafferty v. Payson City,110 an 
impact fee imposed partly for sewer and water was struck down by the court because the ordinance did not 
specify what the funds collected would be used for. The court remanded the case for a determination of the 
reasonableness of the fees in accordance with the test identified in its prior decision Banberry Dev't Corp. 
v. South Jordan City.111 The court held that the municipality has the burden of disclosing the basis of its 
calculations to whomever challenges the reasonableness of the fees.112 
The calculation of a park impact fee should insure that the fee is reasonably proportionate to the cost of 
providing the additional park facilities and open space attributable by the new development. In Hollywood 
v. Broward County,113 the court refused to characterize a park impact fee as a tax. Instead the court held 
the fee as valid on the grounds that the cost anticipated to be paid by the county would exceed the amount 
generated by the fee.114 
The constitutional standards for fee calculations after Dolan is set out in some detail in part II of this 
paper. Likewise, in the pre-Dolan case of Commercial Builders of Northern California v. City of 
Sacramento,115 the court noted with approval the detailed consultant's report commissioned by 
Sacramento to derive a low-income housing needs basis for requiring fees for such housing from a hotel 
developer. Also important to the court was the willingness of Sacramento to pay for a far larger share of 
such housing than the city's consultant report would have required. 
There are two broad categories of impact fee ordinances based on method of computation: 1) fixed fee 
based on a unit of development, and 2) variable formula calculated on a standard relative to the need for 
facilities generated by the development.116 Attached in the appendix are examples of each type. While 
most ordinances are of the fixed variety and take the form of a per-unit charge, the formula approach more 
accurately reflects the proportionate costs of public facilities attributable to specific types of new 
development. This is a distinct advantage, given the importance which the Dolan opinion attaches to 
proportionality.117 
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